Roe vs. Wade [1973] - Povijest

Roe vs. Wade [1973] - Povijest


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ROE ET AL. V. WADE, OKRUŽNI ODVJETNIK ŽUPANIJE DALLAS

ŽALBA OKRUŽNOG SUDA UJEDINJENIH DRŽAVA ZA SJEVERNI OKRUG TEXAS

NE. 70-18. ARGUIRANO 13. PROSINCA 1971.-- PRIJAVLJENO 11. LISTOPADA 1972.- ODLUČENO 22. SIJEČNJA 1973. GODINE

Trudna slobodna žena (srna) podnijela je grupnu tužbu osporavajući ustavnost teksaških kaznenih zakona o pobačajima, koji propisuju nabavljanje ili pokušaj pobačaja, osim prema liječničkom savjetu u svrhu spašavanja života majke. Dopušteno je intervenirati licenciranom liječniku (Hallford), koji je protiv njega vodio dva državna kaznena postupka protiv pobačaja. Bračni par bez djece (žena), supruga koja nije trudna, zasebno je napao zakone, temeljeći navodnu ozljedu na budućim mogućnostima neuspjeha kontracepcije, trudnoći, nespremnosti za roditeljstvo i narušavanju zdravlja žene. Okružni sud od tri suca, koji je objedinio radnje, zaključio je da su Roe i Hallford, te članovi njihovih klasa, mogli tužiti i iznijeli sporne sporove. Odlučivši da je deklarativno, iako ne i zabranjeno, olakšanje bilo opravdano, sud je proglasio statut pobačaja nevažećim kao nejasan i pretjerano krši prava na izmjene Devete i četrnaeste izmjene tih tužitelja. Sud je zaključio da se žalba ne može rješavati. Podnosioci žalbe izravno su se žalili ovom sudu na presude o zabrani, a tužitelj je uložio žalbu na odobrenje Okružnog suda za deklarativnu olakšicu Srnu i Hallfordu. Održanog:
1. Dok je 28 U.S.C. § 1253 ne dopušta izravnu žalbu ovom Sudu zbog odobravanja ili odbijanja deklarativne olakšice, revizija se ne može spriječiti kada je slučaj propisno pred Sudom po žalbi zbog posebnog odbijanja sudske zabrane i argumenti koji se odnose na sudsku i deklaracijsku pravnu pomoć nužno identičan.

2. Srna ima tužbu; Do i Hallford nemaju. .

(a) Suprotno tuženoj tvrdnji, prirodni prekid Roine trudnoće nije poništio njezino odijelo. Sudski sporovi koji uključuju trudnoću, koja se "može ponoviti, ali izbjegava preispitivanje", iznimka su od uobičajenog saveznog pravila da stvarna kontroverza mora postojati u fazama pregleda, a ne samo kada je radnja pokrenuta.

(b) Okružni sud je ispravno odbio sudsku zabranu, ali je pogriješio dodijelivši deklaratornu olakšicu Hallfordu, koji je tvrdio da nema federalno zaštićenih prava koja se ne mogu ustvrditi kao obrana od državnih kaznenih progona koji se vode protiv njega. Samuels protiv Mackella, 401 U.S. 66.

(c) Prigovor "Ne", zasnovan na nepredviđenim okolnostima, od kojih se jedan ili više njih možda neće dogoditi, previše je spekulativan da bi predstavio stvarni slučaj ili kontroverzu.

3. Državni kazneni zakoni o pobačaju, poput onih koji su ovdje uključeni, koji osim kriminala samo postupak spašavanja života u ime majke bez obzira na fazu trudnoće i druge uključene interese krše klauzulu o pravičnom postupku iz Četrnaestog amandmana, koja štiti protiv djelovanja države pravo na privatnost, uključujući kvalificirano pravo žene na prekid trudnoće. Iako država ne može nadjačati to pravo, ona ima legitimne interese u zaštiti i zdravlja trudnice i potencijala ljudskog života, od kojih svaki interes raste i dostiže "uvjerljivu" točku u različitim fazama ženskog pristupa terminu. ( a) Za fazu prije otprilike kraja prvog tromjesečja, odluka o pobačaju i njezino izvršavanje moraju se prepustiti liječničkoj procjeni liječnika koji je nazočio trudnici.

(b) Za fazu koja slijedi otprilike do kraja prvog tromjesečja, država, promičući svoj interes za zdravlje majke, može, ako to odluči, regulirati postupak pobačaja na načine koji su razumno povezani sa zdravljem majke.

(c) U fazi koja slijedi nakon održivosti, država, promičući svoj interes za potencijal ljudskog života, može, ako odluči, regulirati, pa čak i zabraniti pobačaj, osim prema potrebi, prema odgovarajućoj medicinskoj procjeni, radi očuvanja život ili zdravlje majke 4. Država može definirati pojam "liječnik" kao samo liječnika koji trenutno ima licencu države, te može zabraniti bilo koji pobačaj od strane osobe koja nije liječnik kako je definirano. Str. 165.

5. Nije potrebno odlučivati ​​o sudskim mjerama, jer će teksaške vlasti nesumnjivo u potpunosti priznati odluku Suda da su teksaški zakoni o pobačaju protivustavni.

314 F.Sup. 1217, djelomično potvrđeno i djelomično poništeno. MR. PRAVDA BLACKMUN dostavila je mišljenje Suda.

Ova savezna žalba u Teksasu i njezin suputnik u Georgiji, Doe protiv Boltona, post, str. 179, predstavljaju ustavne osporave državnog zakonodavstva o pobačaju. Teksaški zakoni koji su ovdje napadnuti tipični su za one koji su u mnogim državama na snazi ​​otprilike jedno stoljeće. Gruzijski statuti, nasuprot tome, imaju modernu glumačku postavu i zakonodavni su proizvod koji barem u određenoj mjeri očito odražava utjecaje nedavne promjene stava, napredovanja medicinskog znanja i tehnika i novog razmišljanja o starom pitanju.

Odmah priznajemo našu svijest o osjetljivoj i emocionalnoj prirodi polemike o pobačaju, snažnim suprotnim stavovima, čak i među liječnicima, te dubokim i naizgled apsolutnim uvjerenjima koje subjekt inspirira. Nečija filozofija, vlastita iskustva, izloženost sirovim rubovima ljudskog postojanja, vjerska obučenost, stavovi prema životu i obitelji i njihovim vrijednostima te moralni standardi koje se uspostavljaju i nastoje promatrati vjerojatno će utjecati i obojati čovjeka razmišljanja i zaključci o pobačaju.

Osim toga, rast stanovništva, zagađenje, siromaštvo i rasni prizvuk kompliciraju, a ne pojednostavljuju problem.

Naš je zadatak, naravno, riješiti to pitanje ustavnim mjerenjem, bez emocija i sklonosti. Ozbiljno nastojimo to učiniti, i zato što to činimo, raspitali smo se i, prema tome mišljenju, stavljamo naglasak na medicinsku i medicinsko-pravnu povijest i ono što ta povijest otkriva o stavovima čovjeka prema postupku pobačaja kroz stoljeća. Također imamo na umu opomenu gospodina pravosuđa Holmesa u njegovom sada opravdanom neslaganju u predmetu Lochner protiv New Yorka, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905):
[Ustav] je napravljen za ljude s temeljno različitim gledištima, a slučajnost našeg zaključka da su određena mišljenja prirodna i poznata ili nova, pa čak i šokantna ne bi trebala zaključiti naš sud o pitanju jesu li statuti koji ih utjelovljuju u suprotnosti s Ustavom Sjedinjenih Država.

Ja

Teksaški statuti koji nas se ovdje tiču ​​su Umjetnost. 1191-1194 i 1196 Kaznenog zakona države. [n1] To čini zločin "pobačaj", kako je u njemu definirano [p*118], ili pokušaj pokušaja, osim u odnosu na "pobačaj koji je obavljen ili pokušan liječničkim savjetima u svrhu spašavanja života majka." Slični statuti postoje u većini država. Texas je prvi put donio zakon o kriminalnom pobačaju 1854. Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, § 1, izloženo u 3 H. Gammel, Teksaški zakoni 1502 (1898). To je ubrzo preinačeno u jezik koji je do danas ostao bitno nepromijenjen. Vidi Teksaški kazneni zakon iz 1857., c. 7, umjetnost. 531-536; G. Paschal, Teksaški zakoni, umjetnost. 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev.Stat., C. 8, umjetnost. 536-541 (1879); Texas Rev.Crim.Stat., Umjetnost. 1071-1076 (1911). Završni članak u svakoj od ovih zbirki pružao je istu iznimku, kao i ovaj članak 1196., za pobačaj "liječničkim savjetom u svrhu spašavanja života majke".

Jane Roe, [n4] slobodna žena koja je boravila u okrugu Dallas u Teksasu, pokrenula je ovu saveznu tužbu u ožujku 1970. protiv okružnog tužitelja okruga. Tražila je deklaratornu presudu da su teksaški zakoni o pobačaju protivustavni na licu lica, te zabranu kojom se okrivljenik sputava u provedbi zakona.

Roe je tvrdila da je neudana i trudna; da je željela prekinuti trudnoću pobačajem "koji je izveo nadležni, licencirani liječnik, pod sigurnim, kliničkim uvjetima"; da nije mogla napraviti "legalni" pobačaj u Teksasu jer se činilo da joj život nije ugrožen nastavkom trudnoće; te da si nije mogla dopustiti putovanje u drugu jurisdikciju kako bi osigurala legalni pobačaj pod sigurnim uvjetima. Tvrdila je da su teksaški statuti neustavno nejasni i da su joj skratili pravo na osobnu privatnost, zaštićeno Prvim, Četvrtim, Petim, Devetim i Četrnaestim amandmanima. Izmjenom svoje pritužbe, Roe je navodno tužila "u svoje ime i sve druge žene" na sličnoj poziciji.

James Hubert Hallford, licencirani liječnik, zatražio je i dobio dopuštenje da se umiješa u Roeinu akciju. U svojoj pritužbi tvrdio je da je prethodno bio uhićen zbog kršenja teksaških statuta pobačaja, te da se protiv njega vode dva takva kaznena progona. Opisao je stanje pacijenata koji su mu dolazili tražeći pobačaj, te je tvrdio da u mnogim slučajevima on, kao liječnik, nije mogao utvrditi spadaju li oni unutar ili izvan iznimke priznate člankom 1196. Tvrdio je da je, kao posljedica toga, statuti su bili nejasni i nesigurni, kršeći Četrnaesti amandman, te da su povrijedili njegovo i pravo njegovih pacijenata na privatnost u odnosu liječnik-pacijent i njegovo pravo na bavljenje medicinom, prava za koja je tvrdio da su zajamčena Prvim, Četvrtim , Peti, Deveti i Četrnaesti amandman. John i Mary Doe, bračni par, podnijeli su prateću tužbu Roeovoj. Također su imenovali okružnog tužitelja kao tuženika, tvrdili su poput ustavnih oduzimanja i tražili deklaratornu i sudsku zabranu. Doovi su tvrdili da su bili par bez djece; da gospođa Doe pati od "neuro-kemijskog" poremećaja; da joj je liječnik "savjetovao da izbjegava trudnoću sve dok se njezino stanje materijalno ne poboljša" (iako trudnoća u ovom trenutku ne bi predstavljala "ozbiljan rizik" za njezin život); da je, prema liječničkim savjetima, prestala koristiti kontracepcijske pilule; i da bi, ako bi zatrudnjela, htjela prekinuti trudnoću pobačajem koji bi obavio nadležni, licencirani liječnik pod sigurnim, kliničkim uvjetima. Izmjenom njihove pritužbe, Do je navodno tužio "u svoje ime i sve parove na sličnom položaju". Prigovor dr. Hallforda na intervenciju stoga treba odbaciti. [n7] Dopušten mu je obrana u državnom kaznenom postupku protiv njega. Poništavamo presudu Okružnog suda u onoj mjeri u kojoj je dr. Hallfordu odobrena olakšica, a njegova intervencija nije odbijena.

C. Čini li. S obzirom na našu odluku o stajalištu Roe u njezinu predmetu, pitanje o stajalištu Doe u njihovom slučaju ima mali značaj. Tvrdnje koje iznose u biti su iste kao i Roeove, a napadaju iste statute. Ipak, ukratko napominjemo držanje Do.

Njihovi zahtjevi predstavljaju ih kao bračni par bez djece, ženu koja nije trudna, koji u ovom trenutku nemaju želju imati djecu zbog toga što su dobili liječnički savjet da gospođa Doe treba izbjegavati trudnoću, te iz "drugih vrlo osobnih razloga". Ali oni "strahuju. Mogli bi se suočiti s izgledom da postanu [p*128] roditelji." A ako dođe do trudnoće, "htjeli bi je prekinuti" pobačajem. Tvrde nemogućnost legalnog pobačaja u Teksasu i posljedično, mogućnost da tamo dobiju ilegalni pobačaj ili da odu izvan Teksasa na neko mjesto gdje se postupak može legalno i kompetentno pribaviti.

Stoga imamo kao tužitelje bračni par koji ima, kako se tvrdi, neposrednu i sadašnju ozljedu, samo navodno "štetan učinak na [njihovu] bračnu sreću" jer su prisiljeni "odlučiti se suzdržati se od normalnih spolnih odnosa ili ugroziti Mariju" Srno zdravlje kroz moguću trudnoću. " Njihova tvrdnja je da bi, negdje u budućnosti, gospođa Doe mogla zatrudnjeti zbog mogućeg neuspjeha mjera kontracepcije, te bi u to vrijeme u budućnosti mogla poželjeti pobačaj koji bi tada mogao biti nezakonit prema teksaškim zakonima.

Upravo to izražavanje stava "čini" otkriva njegov spekulativni karakter. Njihova navodna ozljeda počiva na mogućem budućem neuspjehu kontracepcije, mogućoj budućoj trudnoći, mogućoj budućoj nespremnosti za roditeljstvo i mogućem narušavanju zdravlja u budućnosti. Jedna ili više od ovih nekoliko mogućnosti se možda neće dogoditi, a sve se možda neće kombinirati. Prema procjeni Ne ', te bi mogućnosti mogle imati stvarni ili zamišljeni utjecaj na njihovu bračnu sreću. No, nismo spremni reći da je gola tvrdnja o tako neizravnoj ozljedi dovoljna za predstavljanje stvarnog slučaja ili kontroverze. Mlađi protiv Harrisa, 401 SAD, 41-42; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 SAD na 109-110; Abele protiv Markle, 452 F.2d na 1124-1125; Crossen protiv Breckenridgea, 446 F.2d na 839. Tvrdnja o neispunjenosti daleko je od onih riješenih na drugi način u slučajevima koje nam Poziva na nas, naime, Investment Co. Institute protiv Camp, 401 US 617 (1971); Usluga obrade podataka protiv Kampa, 397 US 150 (1970); i Epperson protiv Arkansasa, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). Vidi također Truax protiv Raicha, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).

Stoga Doi nisu odgovarajući tužitelji u ovoj parnici. Okružni sud je njihovu žalbu pravilno odbacio i mi potvrđujemo to odbacivanje.

Glavni smisao apelantovog napada na teksaške statute je da oni nepropisno napadaju pravo, za koje se tvrdi da ga posjeduje trudnica, da odluče prekinuti trudnoću. Žalilac bi ovo pravo otkrio u konceptu osobne "slobode" utjelovljenom u Četrnaestoj izmjeni i dopuni klauzule o pravičnom postupku; ili u osobnoj, bračnoj, obiteljskoj i seksualnoj privatnosti za koju se kaže da je zaštićena Zakonom o pravima ili njegovim poluotocima, vidi Griswold protiv Connecticuta, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); iskaznica. na 460 (BIJELO, J., kao rezultat); ili među onim pravima koja su ljudima pridržana Devetim amandmanom, Griswold protiv 486 (Goldberg, J., suglasno). Prije nego se pozabavimo ovom tvrdnjom, smatramo da je poželjno ukratko ispitati, u nekoliko aspekata, povijest pobačaja, radi takvog uvida koji nam ta povijest može omogućiti, a zatim ispitati državne svrhe i interese koji stoje iza zakona o kaznenim pobačajima.

Možda se općenito ne cijeni da su restriktivni kazneni zakoni o pobačajima koji su na snazi ​​u većini današnjih država relativno novi. Ti zakoni, koji općenito zabranjuju pobačaj ili njegov pokušaj u bilo koje doba trudnoće, osim kad je to potrebno za očuvanje života trudnice, nisu drevnog niti čak podrijetla iz običajnog prava. Umjesto toga, oni proizlaze iz zakonskih promjena koje su većinom izvršene u drugoj polovici 19. stoljeća.

1. Drevni stavovi. Oni ne mogu precizno odrediti. Rečeno nam je da su u vrijeme Perzijskog carstva bili poznati abortifikanti i da su kriminalni pobačaji bili strogo kažnjavani. Također nam je rečeno da se pobačaj prakticirao u grčko vrijeme kao i u rimsko doba te da se "na njega pribjeglo bez skrupulacije". Efežanin Soranos, često opisivan kao najveći od drevnih ginekologa, čini se da se općenito protivio prevladavajućoj praksi slobodnog pobačaja u Rimu. Smatrao je da je potrebno prvo razmisliti o majčinom životu, te je pribjegao pobačaju kad je, prema ovom standardu, smatrao da je postupak preporučljiv. Grčki i rimski zakon pružao je malo zaštite nerođenima. Ako je pobačaj na nekim mjestima procesuiran, čini se da se temeljio na konceptu kršenja očevog prava na potomstvo. Drevna religija nije zabranjivala pobačaj.

2. Hipokratova zakletva. Što je s glasovitom zakletvom koja je toliko dugo stajala kao etički vodič medicinske struke i nosi ime velikog Grka (460 (?)-377 (?) Pr. Kr.), Koji je opisan kao Otac medicine, "najmudriji i najveći praktičar svoje umjetnosti" i "najvažnija i najpotpunija medicinska ličnost antike", koji je dominirao medicinskim školama svog vremena i koji je tipizirao zbir medicinskog znanja iz prošlosti? Zakletva se donekle razlikuje ovisno o prijevodu, ali u svakom prijevodu sadržaj je jasan:
Neću nikome dati smrtonosne lijekove ako me zamole, niti ću predložiti takve savjete; i na sličan način, neću dati ženi pesar za izvođenje pobačaja, niti ću ikome dati smrtonosni lijek ako to zatražim, niti ću u tom smislu dati prijedlog. Slično tome, neću dati ženi abortivan lijek.

Iako se Zakletva ne spominje ni u jednom od glavnih sažetaka u ovom slučaju niti u Doe protiv Boltona, post, ona predstavlja vrhunac razvoja strogih etičkih koncepata u medicini, a njezin utjecaj traje do danas. Zašto vlast Hipokrata nije odvratila od prakse pobačaja u svoje i Rimsko doba? Pokojni dr. Edelstein daje nam teoriju: Zakletva nije bila neosporna čak ni u vrijeme Hipokrata; samo se pitagorejska škola filozofa namrštila na povezan samoubilački čin. S druge strane, većina grčkih mislilaca pohvalila je pobačaj, barem prije održivosti. Vidi Platon, Republika, V, 461; Aristotel, Politika, VII, 1335b 25. Međutim, za pitagorejce je to bilo pitanje dogme. Za njih je zametak bio živ od trenutka začeća, a pobačaj je značio uništenje živog bića. Klauzula zakletve o pobačaju, dakle, "odražava pitagorejske doktrine" i "[ni] u drugom sloju grčkog mišljenja nisu takvi stavovi držani niti predloženi u istom duhu beskompromisne štednje".

Doktor Edelstein tada zaključuje da je Zakletva nastala u skupini koja predstavlja samo mali segment grčkog mišljenja, te da je zasigurno nisu prihvatili svi drevni liječnici. Ističe kako medicinski zapisi do Galena (A.D. 130-200) »svjedoče o kršenju gotovo svake njegove zabrane«. [n18] No s krajem antike dogodila se odlučna promjena. Otpor protiv samoubojstva i protiv pobačaja postao je uobičajen. Zakletva je postala popularna. Nastajuća učenja kršćanstva bila su u skladu s pitagorejskom etikom. Zakletva je "postala jezgra sve medicinske etike" i "pljeskana je kao utjelovljenje istine". Dakle, sugerira dr. Edelstein, to je "pitagorejski manifest, a ne izraz apsolutnog standarda liječničkog ponašanja".

Čini nam se da je to zadovoljavajuće i prihvatljivo objašnjenje prividne krutosti Hipokratove zakletve. Omogućuje nam razumijevanje, u povijesnom kontekstu, dugo prihvaćene i cijenjene izjave o medicinskoj etici.

3. Opće pravo. Nesporno je da, prema običajnom pravu, pobačaj obavljen prije "ubrzavanja" - prvog prepoznatljivog kretanja fetusa u maternici, koji se obično javljao od 16. do 18. tjedna trudnoće - nije bio krivični prekršaj. Čini se da je odsutnost zločina u zajedničkom pravu za unaprijed ubrzavanje pobačaja nastalo iz ušća ranijih filozofskih, teoloških i građanskih te kanonskopravnih koncepata o tome kada život počinje. Ove su discipline različito pristupile pitanju u smislu točke u kojoj su embrij ili fetus postali "formirani" ili prepoznatljivo ljudi, ili u smislu kada je "osoba" nastala, odnosno natopljena "dušom" ili "animiranom" . " U ranom engleskom pravu razvio se labavi konsenzus da su se ti događaji dogodili u nekom trenutku između začeća i živorođenja. Ovo je bila "posrednička animacija". Premda su kršćanska teologija i kanonsko pravo donijeli točku animacije na 40 dana za muškarca i 80 dana za ženu, gledište koje je postojalo sve do 19. stoljeća, inače nije bilo slaganja o točnom vremenu nastanka ili animacije. Dogovoreno je, međutim, da se prije ovog trenutka fetus trebao smatrati dijelom majke, pa njegovo uništenje stoga nije bilo ubojstvo. Zbog kontinuirane nesigurnosti oko točnog vremena kada se animacija dogodila, zbog nedostatka bilo kakve empirijske osnove za pogled od 40-80 dana, a možda i zbog Akvinske definicije kretanja kao jednog od dvaju prvih principa života, Bracton se usredotočio na ubrzavanje kao kritična točka. Značaj ubrzanja potvrdili su i kasniji učenjaci običajnog prava, koji je u ovoj zemlji pronašao svoj put do primljenog običajnog prava.

Još uvijek se osporava je li pobačaj brzog fetusa bio krivično djelo po običaju ili čak manji zločin. Bracton, koji je pisao početkom 13. stoljeća, mislio je da je to ubojstvo. No kasnije i prevladavajuće gledište, koje slijedi velike učenjake običajnog prava, bilo je da je to, u najvećoj mjeri, manji prekršaj. U često citiranom odlomku Coke je zauzeo stav da je pobačaj žene "brze s djetetom" "velika zabluda, a ne ubojstvo". Blackstone ga je slijedio, rekavši da se, premda se pobačaj nakon ubrzavanja nekada smatrao ubojstvom iz nehata (iako ne i ubojstvom), "moderno pravo" zauzelo manje strogo stajalište. Nedavni pregled presedana običajnog prava tvrdi, međutim, da su ti presedani u suprotnosti s Colom i da čak ni post-ubrzavajući pobačaj nikada nije utvrđen kao zločin po običaju. Ovo je od neke važnosti, jer, iako je većina američkih sudova presuđivala, držeći ordictum, da pobačaj neozlijeđenog fetusa nije kazneno djelo prema njihovom uobičajenom pravu, drugi su slijedili Colu navodeći da je pobačaj brzog fetusa "zabluda", izraz koji su preveli kao "prekršaj." Da je njihovo oslanjanje na Colu u ovom aspektu zakona bilo nekritično i, očito u svim prijavljenim slučajevima, izreka (vjerojatno zbog nedostatka kaznenih progona po običajnom pravu za post-ubrzavanje pobačaja), čini sada sumnjivim da je pobačaj ikada bio čvrsto utvrđen kao zločin općeg prava čak i s obzirom na uništavanje brzog fetusa. Engleski zakonski zakon. Prvi engleski statut kriminalnog pobačaja, Zakon lorda Ellenborougha, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, došlo 1803. godine. Pobačaj brzog fetusa, § 1, učinio je teškim zločinom, ali je, u § 2, predvidio manje kazne za teško djelo pobačaja prije ubrzavanja, i na taj način sačuvao razliku "ubrzavanja". Taj je kontrast nastavljen u općoj reviziji iz 1828., 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, § 13. Međutim, nestao je zajedno sa smrtnom kaznom 1837. godine, 7 Will. 4 i 1 žrtva, c. 85. § 6, a nije se ponovno pojavio u Zakonu o kaznenim djelima protiv osobe iz 1861., žrtve 24. i 25., c. 100, § 59, koji je činio jezgru engleskog zakona protiv pobačaja do liberalizacijskih reformi 1967. Godine 1929. Zakon o očuvanju dojenčadi (očuvanje), 19. i 20. Geo. 5, c. 34, nastao. Naglasak je bio na uništavanju "života djeteta sposobnog za živo rođenje". To je učinilo namjerno djelo izvedeno s potrebnom namjerom kao krivično djelo. Sadržavao je uvjet da se netko ne može smatrati krivim za djelo osim ako se ne dokaže da djelo koje je prouzročilo smrt djeteta nije učinjeno u dobroj vjeri samo u svrhu očuvanja života majke.

Naizgled zapažen razvoj u engleskom pravu bio je slučaj Rex protiv Bournea, [1939] 1 K.B. 687. Ovaj je slučaj očito potvrdno odgovorio na pitanje je li pobačaj potreban za očuvanje života trudnice izuzet od kaznenih kazni iz Zakona iz 1861. godine. U svojim uputama poroti sudac Macnaghten pozvao se na Zakon iz 1929. godine i primijetio da se taj Zakon odnosi na "slučaj kada je dijete ubijeno namjernim činom u vrijeme kada se ono rađa u uobičajenom tijeku prirode". Iskaznica. na 691. Zaključio je da je upotreba riječi "nezakonito" u Zakonu iz 1861. uvela isto značenje izraženo posebnim uvjetom u Zakonu iz 1929., iako se u Zakonu iz 1861. nije spominjalo očuvanje života majke. Zatim je tumačio izraz "očuvanje života majke" općenito, to jest, "u razumnom smislu", tako da uključuje ozbiljnu i trajnu prijetnju zdravlju majke, te je naložio poroti da oslobodi dr. Bournea ako utvrdi da je djelovao u dobroj vjeri uvjeren da je pobačaj neophodan u tu svrhu. Iskaznica. na 693-694. Porota je donijela oslobađajuću presudu.

Nedavno je parlament donio novi zakon o pobačaju. Ovo je Zakon o pobačaju iz 1967., 15 i 16 Eliz. 2, c. 87. Zakon dopušta licenciranom liječniku da izvrši pobačaj ako se dva druga licencirana liječnika slože (a) da bi nastavak trudnoće uključivao rizik po život trudnice ili ozljede tjelesnog ili mentalnog zdravlja trudnice žena ili bilo koje postojeće djece u njezinoj obitelji, veći nego ako bi se trudnoća prekinula, ili (b) da postoji znatan rizik da bi, ako se dijete rodilo, patilo od takvih tjelesnih ili mentalnih abnormalnosti koje bi bile ozbiljno hendikepirane.

Zakon također predviđa da se prilikom donošenja ove odluke "može uzeti u obzir stvarno ili razumno predvidivo okruženje trudnice". Također dopušta liječniku, bez pristanka drugih, da prekine trudnoću ako smatra da je pobačaj "odmah neophodan kako bi se spasio život ili spriječile teške trajne ozljede tjelesnog ili duševnog zdravlja trudnice" žena."

5. Američki zakon. U ovoj zemlji, zakon koji je bio na snazi ​​u svim osim u nekoliko država do sredine 19. stoljeća bilo je već postojeće englesko pravo. Connecticut, prva država koja je donijela zakone o pobačaju, usvojila je 1821. taj dio Zakona lorda Ellenborougha koji se odnosi na ženu "brzu s djetetom". Smrtna kazna nije izrečena. Pobačaj prije ubrzavanja učinjen je zločinom u toj državi tek 1860. [n30] 1828. New York je donio zakon koji je, u dva aspekta, trebao poslužiti kao model za rane statute protiv pobačaja. Prvo, iako je zabranjivalo uništavanje neobuzdanog fetusa, kao i brzog fetusa, to je od prvog učinilo samo prekršaj, ali je potonje ubojstvo drugog stupnja. Drugo, on je uključio koncept terapijskog pobačaja navodeći da je pobačaj opravdan ako je moralo biti potrebno za očuvanje života takve majke ili su ih dvojica liječnika savjetovali da su potrebni u tu svrhu.

Do 1840. godine, kada je Teksas primio opće pravo, samo je osam američkih država imalo statute koji se bave pobačajem. Tek nakon rata između država to je zakonodavstvo općenito počelo zamjenjivati ​​opće pravo. Većina ovih početnih statuta ozbiljno se bavila pobačajem nakon ubrzavanja, ali bili su blagi prema njemu prije ubrzavanja. Većina je pokušaja podjednako kažnjavala dovršenim pobačajima. Iako su mnogi statuti uključivali iznimku za pobačaj za koji su mislili da je jedan ili više liječnika nužan da bi se spasio majčin život, ta je odredba ubrzo nestala, a tipični zakon zahtijevao je da postupak doista bude neophodan u tu svrhu. Postepeno, sredinom i krajem 19. stoljeća, razlika koja se ubrzava nestala je iz zakonskih propisa većine država, a stupanj prekršaja i kazne su povećani. Do kraja 1950 -ih, velika većina jurisdikcija zabranila je pobačaj, međutim i kad god bi se to učinilo, osim ako je učinjeno radi spašavanja ili očuvanja života majke. Izuzeci, Alabama i Distrikt Columbia, dopuštali su pobačaj radi očuvanja zdravlja majke. Tri države su dopustile pobačaje koji nisu "nezakonito" izvedeni ili koji nisu "bez zakonskog opravdanja", ostavljajući tumačenje tih standarda sudovima. [n36] U [p*140] u posljednjih nekoliko godina, međutim, trend liberalizacije statuta pobačaja rezultirao je usvajanjem, otprilike jedne trećine država, manje strogih zakona, od kojih je većina po uzoru na model ALI Kazneni zakon, § 230.3, izložen kao Dodatak B mišljenju u Doe v. 205.

Stoga je očito da se, prema općem pravu, u vrijeme donošenja našeg Ustava, i tijekom većeg dijela 19. stoljeća, na pobačaj gledalo s manje nemilosti nego prema većini američkih zakona koji su trenutno na snazi. Drugim riječima, žena je uživala znatno šire pravo na prekid trudnoće nego u većini današnjih država. Barem s obzirom na ranu fazu trudnoće, a vrlo vjerojatno i bez takvog ograničenja, prilika za ovaj izbor bila je prisutna u ovoj zemlji sve do 19. stoljeća. Čak i kasnije, zakon je nastavio neko vrijeme da se manje kazneno tretira pobačaj koji je obavljen u ranoj trudnoći.

6. Stav Američkog liječničkog udruženja. Raspoloženje protiv pobačaja koje je vladalo u ovoj zemlji krajem 19. stoljeća dijelilo je i medicinsko zvanje. Doista, stav profesije mogao je u tom razdoblju odigrati značajnu ulogu u donošenju strogih zakona o pobačaju.

U svibnju 1857. imenovan je AMA -in odbor za kriminalni pobačaj. Predstavio je svoje izvješće, 12 Trans. Am.Med.Assn. 778 (1859), na dvanaestu godišnju skupštinu. U tom je izvješću primijećeno da je Odbor imenovan za istraživanje kriminalnog pobačaja "s ciljem njegova općeg suzbijanja". Ožalio je pobačaj i njegovu učestalost te naveo tri uzroka "ove opće demoralizacije":
Prvi od ovih uzroka je široko rasprostranjeno nepoznavanje javnosti o pravom karakteru zločina - vjerovanje, čak i među samim majkama, da fetus nije živ tek nakon razdoblja ubrzavanja.

Drugi od agenata na koje se aludira je činjenica da se sama profesija često smatra nemarnom za fetalni život. .

Treći razlog zastrašujućeg opsega ovog zločina nalazi se u teškim nedostacima naših zakona, uobičajenih i zakonskih, u pogledu neovisnog i stvarnog postojanja djeteta prije rođenja, kao živog bića. Ove pogreške, koje su u većini slučajeva dovoljne za sprječavanje osude, temelje se i temelje samo na pogrešnim i eksplodiranim medicinskim dogmama. Uz čudnu nedosljednost, zakon u potpunosti priznaje fetus in utero i njegova inherentna prava, u građanske svrhe; dok je osobno i kriminalno pogođen, ne uspijeva ga prepoznati, [p*142] i do kraja života uskraćuje svaku zaštitu.

Iskaznica. na 776. Odbor je tada ponudio, a Udruga je usvojila, rezolucije u kojima se protestiralo "protiv takvog neopravdanog uništavanja ljudskog života", pozivajući državna zakonodavna tijela da revidiraju svoje zakone o pobačajima, te traže suradnju državnih liječničkih društava "u isticanju ove teme". Iskaznica. u 28, 78.

1871. Odbor za kazneni pobačaj podnio je dugo i živo izvješće. Završilo je promatranjem,

Morali smo se baviti ljudskim životom. Što se tiče manje važnosti, ne bismo mogli pristati na kompromis. Pošten sudac u klupi bi stvari nazvao pravim imenom. Nismo mogli učiniti ništa manje.


"Zapanjujuće odobrenje za pobačaj": Roe protiv Wade Reactions

Ono što se dogodilo Jane Roe u to vrijeme nije bilo ništa posebno.

Htjela je abortus i nije ga mogla dobiti. So, like many others, she had a child and gave him up for adoption. But then she did something that bio unusual: she sued. The case that bears her name, Roe v. Wade, was decided on this day, Jan. 22, in 1973. As TIME reported in the Feb. 5 issue of that year, under the headline “A Stunning Approval for Abortion”:

Soon after her illegitimate son was born two years ago, “Jane Roe,” a divorced Dallas bar waitress, put him up for adoption. At almost the same time, “Mary Doe,” an Atlanta housewife, bore a child who was also promptly adopted. Both women had asked for abortions and, like thousands of others, they had been turned down. Unlike most of the others, though, Roe and Doe went to court to attack the state statutes that frustrated them. The resulting legal fights took too long for either woman to get any practical benefit. But last week they had the satisfaction of hearing the Supreme Court read their pseudonyms into the annals of constitutional law. By a surprising majority of 7 to 2, the court ruled that Roe and Doe had won one of the nation’s most fiercely fought legal battles. Thanks to the Texas waitress and the poverty-stricken Georgia housewife, every woman in the U.S. now has the same right to an abortion during the first six months of pregnancy as she has to any other minor surgery.

The ruling, the story continued, was “bold and uncompromising.” Even states that already had few restrictions on abortion would have to make their laws more lax (by, for example, eliminating residency requirements). From that point, abortion during the first trimester would be off-limits to government intervention after that, the state could make certain regulations but, until the fetus became viable, could not prevent the procedure from happening.

The reasoning, as described in an opinion by Justice Harry Blackmun, was traced to the right of privacy, which he held had become part of the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment. A fetus, Blackmun continued, was not a person and thus has no rights that can run counter to the right to privacy. Further, he took into consideration that many of the U.S. statutes restricting abortion had been written when the procedure was much more dangerous to undertake. The opinion was careful to say that states and doctors were under no obligation to perform abortions, but rather that they not make it illegal for those who would otherwise perform the procedures to do so.

But, even from the first, it was clear that Blackmun’s surety was not echoed nationwide.

Not only did two of his fellow justices disagree, but anti-abortion advocates nationwide also spoke up with their unhappiness about the decision. Protests and angry statements were quick to come, and one group even urged excommunication of Justice Brennan, the court’s resident Catholic. Others lobbied for a constitutional amendment that would force the decision into obsolescence. “No one can predict how successful such an effort would be, but obviously the abortion decision, like those on school prayer, desegregation and criminal rights, has once again brought the court under heated criticism,” TIME commented, noting that a poll taken right before the decision revealed that eliminating first-trimester restrictions was favored among Americans by only a single percentage point more than the opposition. “Such a close division of sentiment can only ensure that while the matter has been settled legally,” the piece continued, “it remains a lightning rod for intense national debate.”

Read the full 1973 story here in the TIME Vault:A Stunning Approval for Abortion


Roe v. Wade

Naši urednici će pregledati ono što ste podnijeli i odlučiti želite li izmijeniti članak.

Roe v. Wade, legal case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on January 22, 1973, ruled (7–2) that unduly restrictive state regulation of abortion is unconstitutional. In a majority opinion written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that a set of Texas statutes criminalizing abortion in most instances violated a woman’s constitutional right of privacy, which it found to be implicit in the liberty guarantee of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).

The case began in 1970 when “Jane Roe”—a fictional name used to protect the identity of the plaintiff, Norma McCorvey—instituted federal action against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas county, Texas, where Roe resided. The Supreme Court disagreed with Roe’s assertion of an absolute right to terminate pregnancy in any way and at any time and attempted to balance a woman’s right of privacy with a state’s interest in regulating abortion. In his opinion, Blackmun noted that only a “compelling state interest” justifies regulations limiting “fundamental rights” such as privacy and that legislators must therefore draw statutes narrowly “to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.” The Court then attempted to balance the state’s distinct compelling interests in the health of pregnant women and in the potential life of fetuses. It placed the point after which a state’s compelling interest in the pregnant woman’s health would allow it to regulate abortion “at approximately the end of the first trimester” of pregnancy. With regard to the fetus, the Court located that point at “capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” or viability.

Repeated challenges since 1973 narrowed the scope of Roe v. Wade but did not overturn it. U Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), the Supreme Court established that restrictions on abortion are unconstitutional if they place an “undue burden” on a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus is viable. U Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (2003), which prohibited a rarely used abortion procedure known as intact dilation and evacuation. U Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016), the Court invoked its decision in Casey to strike down two provisions of a Texas law requiring abortion clinics to meet the standards of ambulatory surgical centres and abortion doctors to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. Four years later, in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo (2020), the Court invoked Whole Woman’s Health to declare unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that was, as the majority noted, nearly identical to Texas’s admitting-privileges law.

In 1998, having undergone two religious conversions, McCorvey publicly declared her opposition to abortion. In the documentary AKA Jane Roe (2020), however, a dying McCorvey claimed that she had been paid by antiabortion groups to support their cause.


The Story Behind Roe v. Wade

The case we now know as Roe v. Wade first began in 1970: A woman named Norma McCorvey, referred to as "Jane Roe" in court documents to protect her privacy, filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas at the time. What made McCorvey file that lawsuit? A new Texas law made abortion outright illegal unless the woman’s life was at risk. Having grown up poor, McCorvey had already given up two children for adoption. She ended up doing the same with a third child, namely because she didn't have the money to either bribe a doctor for an abortion or travel to a place where they were legal.

That said, the criminalization of abortion would disproportionately impact folks living in poverty, like McCorvey, as well as people of color. In June of 1970, the case reached the Texas District Court and, while the court did rule that the state’s abortion ban was unconstitutional, it refused to file an injunction. Neither Roe nor Wade were satisfied with this outcome, so both parties appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear it in 1971.


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What led to the Roe decision in 1973?

By the mid-1960s, a movement had begun to loosen American abortion laws. During the 1930s and 1940s, improvements in obstetric and gynaecological care had made it hard for physicians to justify abortion as a means of saving a woman’s life. Convinced of the wrongful nature of abortion laws that made the procedure illegal even when women would suffer adverse health consequences by continuing with the pregnancy, some doctors demanded reform. In 1959, the American Law Institute (ALI), a group of legal experts, released a draft proposal that would make abortion legal in cases of foetal abnormality, rape or incest, or when there was a threat to the woman’s health.

States from California to Georgia began passing the ALI model law in the mid-1960s. But some doctors, worried that they would fall outside of the narrow ALI exceptions, still refused requests for abortion. Soon, new forces joined the movement for reform: feminists demanded the outright repeal of all abortion restrictions, as did members of the population-control movement (a cause dedicated to curbing demographic growth).

Meanwhile, opponents of abortion – many of whom were tied to the Catholic Church – mounted a state-by-state campaign. To attract a more religiously diverse group of supporters, these activists began defining themselves as defenders of a right to life based on the US Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Those who supported repeal responded that the Constitution protected a right to choose abortion.

Constitutional developments encouraged those demanding repeal. U Griswold v Connecticut (1965), the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut law prohibiting married couples from using birth control. The Court based its decision on a right to privacy that the majority believed was implied in the text of the Constitution: Griswold relied on the idea that the text of the American Constitution had “penumbras” – rights implied by the protections spelled out in the document. In 1972, in Eisenstadt v Baird, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law allowing married, but not unmarried, people to purchase contraceptives.

The stage was set for the Roe odluka.

What did Roe v Wade actually say?

Roe began when Norma McCorvey, a 21-year-old woman from Texas, learned that she was pregnant with her third child. McCorvey wanted to end the pregnancy, and her friends advised her to claim she was raped (so that she could have an abortion). But Texas law did not allow for abortions in cases of rape or incest, and the illegal clinic that McCorvey hoped to use had closed. She eventually found her way to Sarah Weddington, a 25-year-old attorney who herself had had an abortion several years earlier. Weddington and another attorney, Linda Coffee, sought a declaration that Texas’s law – which allowed for abortion only if a woman’s life was at risk – was unconstitutional. A three-judge panel of a Texas district court held that the law was unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. The Court also took a second case, Doe v Bolton, which involved a version of the ALI model law.

Issued in January 1973, the Roe v Wade judgment affirmed that access to safe and legal abortion was a constitutional right. It became a landmark case that effectively legalised abortion across the United States. The judgment held that the right to privacy described in Griswold also protected a woman’s right to choose abortion. However, the Court spoke much more about the rights and beliefs of physicians than many might have expected. Indeed, the Court held that in the first trimester, states had to leave abortion to the “medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician”. The Court developed the trimester framework: regulations were impermissible in the first trimester while in the second trimester the government could regulate only to advance an interest in women’s health, and only after the viability of the foetus had been established could the government advance an interest in foetal life. Roe rejected the claim that the foetus was a rights-holding person, reasoning that the term “person” applied in the Constitution only after birth.

Roe invalidated the majority of abortion laws on the books at the time of the decision, and the ruling intensified an abortion battle that had already reached a fever pitch.

Is Roe the law in the United States of America today?

Yes and no. To answer the question, we need to go back to the years immediately after Roe. At the time, pro-lifers pursued an amendment to the Constitution banning abortion and recognising a right to life. But to keep the number of abortions low, anti-abortion groups also lobbied for gentler laws said to comply with Roe, such as statutes requiring women to wait 24 or 48 hours after visiting a clinic, or consult with their husbands, before having an abortion.

Since the final decades of the 20th century, abortion has become a major political issue. While politicians from both parties could at one time be found in the pro-life and pro-choice camps, the parties’ positions had diverged by 1980. Both Republicans (who generally oppose abortion) and Democrats (who generally favour a right to choose abortion) helped to polarise American debate even further.

After Ronald Reagan won the 1980 presidential election, a majority of lawmakers in both houses of Congress opposed abortion, but pro-lifers were too divided to agree on a constitutional amendment. Anti-abortion groups, however, soon identified a new mission: control of Supreme Court nominations, which would mean the difference for legal abortion. Through presidential elections, the movement would help to determine who made nominations for the Supreme Court. If abortion foes could forge a new majority in the Court, they could ensure that Roe v Wade was overturned.

Over the course of the decade following Reagan’s election, Republican presidents nominated a number of Supreme Court justices, and by 1992, many expected the Court to overturn Roe. But in 1992, in the case of Planned Parenthood v Casey, the Supreme Court preserved a right to abortion and suggested that it had as much to do with equality for women as it did with autonomy. Ali Casey did not leave Roe unscathed. The Court got rid of the trimester framework, instead holding that states could permissibly regulate abortion as long as they did not unduly burden a woman’s right to choose.

Casey did not defuse the conflict. In the 1990s, thousands of protestors tried to blockade clinics in major American cities, and there were a number of shocking cases in which abortion opponents killed doctors who performed the procedure, including Dr David Gunn in 1993 and Dr John Bayard Britton in 1994, both of whom were shot dead.

Pro-lifers continued to chip away at Roe, passing laws that criminalised specific abortion techniques or required women to hear dubious statements about the dangers of abortion before deciding whether or not to proceed. Pro-choice groups, meanwhile, often pushed beyond protection for freedom, instead campaigning for reproductive justice – shorthand for a platform that would not only give women the power to decide when to have children, but also provide women with financial support, jobs, health care, and other resources to raise the children they wished to have.

Why are we seeing so many abortion restrictions now, and will Roe be overturned?

In 2010, a backlash to Barack Obama’s healthcare reform delivered many state legislatures to Republicans, who went on to pass a record number of abortion restrictions. And by 2018, Donald Trump had replaced the Court’s swing vote, Anthony Kennedy, with a judge many predicted would overturn Roe. Anti-abortion lawmakers took hope from the fact that the Federalist Society (a group of conservative jurists, professors, and lawyers) had screened nominees to ensure that they opposed Roe. Several states proceeded to pass laws that were blatantly unconstitutional under Casey, such as laws banning abortion at six weeks or earlier. The point, after all, was to force the Court to reconsider Roe.

So, will the Court undo the right to choose? The smart bet would be that the justices will at the very least dismantle abortion rights, although probably not as quickly as some believe. After all, Chief Justice John Roberts cares deeply about the Court’s reputation for being above partisanship, and Justice Brett Kavanaugh has repeatedly expressed his respect for precedent. Undoing Roe will probably take time – and more than one decision by the Supreme Court. And, as history tells us, we can never be sure what the Court will actually do when it comes to Roe: everyone expected the Court to reverse the ruling in 1992. We could be wrong again.

Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College of Law, specialising in the legal history of reproduction, the family, sexuality, and the Constitution. Her books include After Roe: The Lost History of the Abortion Debate (Harvard University Press, 2015), Beyond Abortion: Roe v. Wade and the Fight for Privacy (Harvard University Press, 2018), andAbortion in America: A Legal History from Roe to the Present(Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).


Movie Review: ‘Roe v. Wade’

Whether Hollywood mogul Samuel Goldwyn ever echoed that sentiment, the advice continues to hold true for screenwriters today. Stories designed to win an argument rarely make for effective entertainment.

A case in point: the historical dramatization “Roe v. Wade” (Quiver). Good intentions can only partially sustain this re-creation of events surrounding the landmark 1973 Supreme Court case that legalized abortion across the United States. So even those movie fans most committed to the cause of life will be unable to overlook its aesthetic shortcomings.

Primary among these are the film’s overly rhetorical tone and the fact that its script, penned by co-directors Cathy Allyn and Nick Loeb in collaboration with Ken Kushner, comes stuffed full of citations whose appearance in the dialogue registers as anything but natural. In fact, it sometimes feels as though the cast had been turned into walking editions of Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations.

While the picture reveals a few interesting historical sidelights, moreover, Allyn and Loeb fail to bring together the varied ingredients of their story. As a result, viewers may discern the unfulfilled potential of at least three films hovering under the surface here.

The first would be a straightforward recounting of the titular legal proceeding, a still-controversial chapter of history nominally pitting Norma McCorvey (Summer Joy Campbell), a fragile young woman in her early 20s shielded under the legal pseudonym Jane Roe, against Henry Wade (James DuMont), the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas. Numerous questions about the case linger.

Was McCorvey — who later went on to become a prominent figure in pro-life circles — manipulated by her lawyers, Sarah Weddington (Greer Grammar) and Linda Coffee (Justine Wachsberger)?

Were Supreme Court justices unduly swayed by familial pressure such as that which here is depicted as being brought against Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Jon Voight)? Did the involvement of other justices’ family members in the work of Planned Parenthood play a role behind the scenes?

A second movie could be devoted to the conversion story of Dr. Bernard Nathanson (Loeb), from whose perspective the narrative of “Roe v. Wade” is told. Together with activist Larry Lader (Jamie Kennedy), Nathanson became a leader in the political movement to make abortion legal. He also was an indefatigable and prolific abortionist.

The experience of witnessing his own work via the newly developed technology of ultrasound, however, led to a radical transition in Nathanson’s thinking. He became a high-profile opponent of abortion and narrated the 1984 movie “The Silent Scream.”

Still a third picture could focus on the biography of Dr. Mildred Jefferson (Stacey Dash), a long-standing champion of the unborn. Among other achievements, Jefferson was the first Black woman to graduate from Harvard Medical School. A co-founder of the National Right to Life Committee, she served as its president in the 1970s.

As it is, none of these elements jells with the others. Consequently, Allyn and Loeb’s treatment of one of the most controverted political topics in recent history emerges as more ambitious and earnest than successful.

The film contains mature themes, disturbing images, medical gore and a couple of mild oaths. The Catholic News Service classification is A-III — adults. The Motion Picture Association rating is PG-13 — parents strongly cautioned. Some material may be inappropriate for children under 13.


On this day, the Roe v. Wade decision

On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that continues to divide the nation to this day. U Roe v. Wade, the Court ruled that a state law that banned abortions except to save the life of the mother was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision has proven to be one of the most controversial cases in the Court&rsquos history.

Norma L. McCorvey discovered that she was pregnant in June 1969. It was to be her third child, but McCorvey wished to have an abortion. At the time, Texas law only allowed for abortion in cases of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. McCorvey was advised by her friends to falsely assert that she had been raped, but there was no police report to back up this claim. Instead, McCorvey attempted to have an illegal abortion, but she soon discovered that the authorities had shut down the facility.

McCorvey visited a local attorney seeking advice on what to do next. The attorney assisted McCorvey with beginning the process of putting her child up for adoption, and also referred her to Linda Coffee and Sarah Weddington, two recent graduates of the University of Texas Law School.

Coffee and Weddington brought a lawsuit on McCorvey&rsquos behalf (who went by the alias &ldquoJane Roe&rdquo throughout the case to protect her identity) claiming that the state&rsquos law violated Roe&rsquos constitutional rights. The suit claimed that, while her life was not in danger, Roe had a right to obtain an abortion in a safe, medical environment within her home state. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed, and ruled that the Texas law violated Roe&rsquos right to privacy found in the Ninth Amendment, and was therefore unconstitutional.

Texas appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, and the case reached the Court in 1970. However, the Court decided to wait to hear Roe until they had decided Younger v. Harris i United States v. Vuitch. After the Court announced the decision in Vuitch, which upheld the constitutionality of a Washington, D.C. statute that similarly outlawed abortion, the Court voted to hear Roe and the closely related case of Doe v. Bolton.

Arguments in the case began on December 13, 1971. Shortly before that date, Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan II retired from the bench. Chief Justice Warren Burger decided that Roe i Doe, as well as the other cases that were scheduled on the docket, should go on as planned.

Jay Floyd, who was representing Texas in the case, opened his argument with what commentators have described as the &ldquoworst joke in legal history.&rdquo In reference to Coffee and Weddington, the female attorneys representing McCorvey, Floyd began by saying, &ldquoMr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. It&rsquos an old joke, but when a man argues against two beautiful ladies like this, they are going to have the last word.&rdquo

The rest of the case was argued that day. However, as Justice Harry Blackmun was attempting to draft a preliminary opinion based upon the law&rsquos vagueness in May 1971, he proposed to his colleagues that the case be reargued. After some debate on the issue, the case was reargued on October 11, 1972. Texas Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Flowers replaced Jay Floyd for the case&rsquos reargument in front of the Court.

Justice Blackmun remained as the justice selected to the Court&rsquos opinion following the second argument, and on January 22, 1973, the Court issued its 7-2 decision. In it, the Court determined that Texas had violated Roe&rsquos constitutional right to privacy.

Drawing on the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court said that the Constitution protects an individual&rsquos &ldquozones of privacy.&rdquo Citing earlier cases that ruled that contraception, marriage, and child rearing were activities included in these &ldquozones of privacy,&rdquo the Court found that the zone was &ldquobroad enough to encompass a woman&rsquos decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.&rdquo

Because the Court determined that abortions were within a woman&rsquos &ldquozone of privacy,&rdquo it was therefore ruling that a woman had a fundamental right to the procedure. Although this right was fundamental, that did not mean that it could not be limited.

The Court said that as a fundamental right, any limitations on abortion must meet the standards of strict scrutiny. This meant that there must have been &ldquocompelling state interest&rdquo in regulating abortions, and the legislation must have been narrowly tailored to meet this &ldquocompelling&rdquo state interest.

The Court then assessed the state&rsquos interests. Justice Blackmun found two legitimate government interests: protecting the mother&rsquos health and &ldquoprotecting the potentiality of human life.&rdquo In order to balance the fundamental privacy right to abortion with these two state interests, the Court created the trimester framework. This solution determined when the right to abortion would be without limitations, and when the state&rsquos interests would be compelling enough to outweigh the woman&rsquos right to choose.

The Court said that, during the first trimester, the abortion decision was left to the woman and her doctor. Following the first trimester, until fetal viability, the state&rsquos interest in the mother&rsquos health reaches the compelling level, and the state can regulate the procedure, only if it &ldquoreasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.&rdquo When the point of fetal viability is reached, then the state could protect its interest in &ldquopotential life&rdquo and regulate abortion to that end. This includes banning that practice of abortion at that stage in the pregnancy.

In 1992, the Court adjusted the trimester framework in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. In that case, the plurality asserted, under the Fourteenth Amendment, that the mother had a constitutional right to abortion and that this right could not be unduly interfered with by the state prior to viability&mdashwhat&rsquos known now as the &ldquoundue burden&rdquo test.

Još od Roe v. Wade decision was issued in 1973, the case has remained one of the most contentious in the public sphere. It has inspired political campaigns and movement, and sparked debates throughout the nation around ethics, religion, biology, and constitutional law.


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McCorvey was born on Sept. 22, 1947, as Norma Nelson to Mary and Olin Nelson. McCorvey ran away from home at one point and, after returning, was sent to reform school. After the family moved to Houston, her parents divorced when she was 13. McCorvey suffered abuse, met and married Elwood McCorvey at age 16, and left Texas for California.

When she returned, pregnant and frightened, her mother took her baby to raise. McCorvey's second child was raised by the father of the baby with no contact from her. McCorvey initially said that her third pregnancy, the one in question at the time of Roe v. Wade, was the result of rape, but years later she said she had invented the rape story in an attempt to make a stronger case for an abortion. The rape story was of little consequence to her lawyers because they wanted to establish a right to abortion for all women, not just those who had been raped.


Roe v. Wade Was Decided By A Republican-Nominated Supreme Court

One of the major issues in this presidential election concerns the nomination and subsequent appointment of at least one Supreme Court justice and possibly two or more justices.

It seems that among evangelical Christians, two issues in particular are driving support for Donald Trump: the nomination/appointment of Supreme Court justices, and the fact that he is Republican.

Moreover, at the center of the Supreme Court discussion is the 1973 Court decision on Roe vs. Wade.

During the final debate between Clinton and Trump, held at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, on October 19, 2016, and moderated by Chris Wallace of Fox News, Wallace opened the debate with discussion of the Supreme Court. Below are the excerpted responses from Clinton and Trump on the issue of nominating Supreme Court justices, especially as such concerns Roe vs. Wade. (The full transcript can be read here.)

So, we have the Republican presidential candidate opposed to Roe vs. Wade and wanting to appoint justices to overturn it, and we have the Democratic presidential candidate supporting Roe vs. Wade and wanting to nominate justices that will support it.

In the remainder of this post, I address two assumptions/generalizations that evangelical Christians I have interacted with appear to possess: 1) The president has free rein in appointing Supreme Court justices 2) filling the Supreme Court with Republican-nominated/appointed justices will lead to reversal of Roe vs. Wade.

To begin, if the president had free reign in appointing Supreme Court justices, then there would be no current vacancy. President Obama’s March 16, 2016, nomination of Merrick Garland to replace Antonin Scalia, who died on February 13, 2016, is unprecedented in that the Senate simply refused to consider the nomination.

However, the reality is that the president must work with the Senate when nominating a justice because the president’s nomination must first go before the Senate Judiciary Committee then to the full Senate, where a majority vote of Senators present is required to confirm the nomination. (To read about the nomination and confirmation processes, see here and here.)

Thus, no matter the intentions of Trump or Clinton to nominate potential justices with a particular view on Roe vs. Wade (to overturn or not), any nomination must gain approval of the majority of Senators present on the day of a vote to confirm. Currently,Republicans hold a majority in the Senate however, there is no guarantee that such will be the case after November 08th, and what the Senate majority will be when future seats become open on the Court is unknown.

Indeed, some Republican US senators are formulating plans to prevent confirming any Supreme Court nomination from Clinton should she become president.

But let us consider the assumption that justices nominated by Republican presidents will lead to overturning Roe vs. Wade.

If a Supreme Court dominated by nominations by Republican presidents were a guarantee of overturning Roe vs. Wade, then the outcome of Roe vs. Wade would have been different from the outset.

The reality is that in 1973, Roe vs. Wade was decided by a Court that was comprised of a majority of justices who were nominated by Republican presidents.

The vote on Roe vs. Wade was 7-2. Those justices supporting the case’s pro-choice outcome were as follows, including the president nominating each and the president’s party affiliation:

  • Harry Blackmun (Nixon, R)
  • Warren Burger (Nixon, R)
  • William Douglas (FDR, D)
  • William Brennan (Eisenhower, R)
  • Potter Stewart (Eisenhower, R)
  • Thurgood Marshall (LBJ, D)
  • Lewis Powell (Nixon, R)

Those dissenting on Roe vs. Wade — only two – and both were not Republican-president-nominated to the Court:

Nixon nominated four justices. Three concurred on Roe vs. Wade— arguably a decisive factor in the outcome of the case.

The bottom line is that Democratic presidents did not nominate the Supreme Court that produced the Roe vs. Wade outcome that many evangelical Christians believe a Trump/Republican presidency will reverse.

Reality: A Supreme Court dominated by Republican-nominated justices produced Roe vs. Wade.


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